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Case No. 20090839-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
Lemuel Prion, 
Defendant/ Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-3-102(3)(a) (West 
2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
This Court granted the petition on the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of 
Petitioner's rule 22(e) challenge to his re-sentencing. 
See Order, dated 20 January 2010 (a copy is attached in Addendum A). 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court 
of appeals, not the decision of the district court/' Utah Co. v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, % 9, 
179 P.3d 775 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The correctness of the court 
of appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review/' Id. (quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Procedural and constitutional questions present questions of law 
reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling. See Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 25,100 P.3d 1177. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are attached in Addendum B.-
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (Supp. 1994); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sixteen years ago, in August 1994, Defendant pleaded guilty and mentally ill 
[G AMI] at a single hearing to charges in two separate criminal cases. R. 4-5. In Case 
Number 941800068, he pleaded guilty to possession of a dangerous weapon in a 
correctional facility, a second-degree felony. R. 4-5,48. In this case (Case Number 
931800470), he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and dealer in possession 
without affixing a tax stamp, both third-degree felonies.1 Id. 
1
 The record from the original proceeding (Case No. 931800470) was 
destroyed "pursuant to Record Retention schedule" nearly fourteen years after 
entry of Defendant's guilty plea. R. 1. The remaining trial record is before this 
Court in a green folder. The State cites primarily to documents in that folder and 
includes in Addendum C part of the docket from this case involving both the trial 
court's sentencing decisions. The appellate record also contains the record from 
Defendant's second criminal case (Case No. 941800068), located in a red folder. 
Citation to that record, where necessary, is "RR. ." 
2 
At the plea hearing, Judge John R. Anderson heard testimony from Dr. Robert 
J. Howell, PhD., concerning Defendant's mental status and his medication situation. 
R. 5,48. The judge ruled that Defendant was mentally ill, finding: 
1. That the Defendant poses an immediate physical danger to 
himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, 
health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or 
lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation. 
2. That until the Defendant's medication is regulated he cannot 
be committed to the Department of Corrections. 
R. 4,47 (Order stamped 9/1/94, attached in Addendum D); see also Utah Code Ann. 
§77-16a-104(3)(a) (Supp. 1994) (identifying the findings required when sentencing a 
defendant who is guilty and mentally ill). 
In sentencing a mentally ill defendant, section 77-16a-202(l) directed the 
sentencing court to impose a term of imprisonment and commit the defendant to the 
State Hospital for up to eighteen months or until he reached the maximum benefit, 
whichever occurred first. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). If the sentencing 
order included both the commitment and a retention of jurisdiction, then upon 
expiration of the State Hospital commitment, the statute directed the judge to "recall 
the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender." Id. 
Pursuant to the statute, the judge imposed concurrent statutory sentences of 
one-to-fifteen years for the second-degree felony, and zero-to-five years for each of 
3 
the two third-degree felonies. R. 4, 47. He committed Defendant to the State 
Hospital "for care and treatment for not more than eighteen (18) months, or until he 
. . . reached [the] maximum benefit[,] whichever occurs first."2 R. 4, 46-47; Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-202(l)(b) & 77-16a-101(2) (1999). He also expressly ordered 
that at the end of the commitment period, "the Defendant shall be brought before 
this Court for reconsideration in his sentence." R. 46; Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
202(1)(b). The judge also expressly retained jurisdiction "to alter or amend its 
order" and to "resentence" Defendant, as required by section 77-16a-202(l)(b). R. 4, 
46; Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). The court ordered the State Hospital to file a 
progress report with the court and the parties every six months. R. 4,46; Utcih Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-202(3). No objection to the sentencing order appears in the record. 
Five months later, in January 1995, the State Hospital submitted to the court a 
written report, prepared in compliance with the statutory directive in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1999).3 R. 73 (letter date stamped 1/23/95). The report stated 
Defendant had "reached maximum hospital benefit[,]" that the hospital could no 
2
 Dr. Howell recommended the commitment to the State Hospital, in large 
part because "two different physicians" were prescribing the many medications 
Defendant was taking, and he believed "it would be best to have one physician, 
preferably a psychiatrist, managing all of his medications." R. 73 (manila folder, 
letter dated September 7,1994). 
3
 In keeping with Rules 4-202.09(9)(A) and 4-202.02(4)(N), Code of Judicial 
Administration, the State does not include details from the report, but refers the 
Court to the actual report contained in the appellate record. See R. 73. 
4 
longer provide Defendant "with treatment, care, custody, and security that is 
adequate and appropriate for his condition and needs[,]" and, based in part on its 
diagnosis of Defendant, recommended that he "be engaged in some type of sex 
offender program." Id. The report was accompanied by a "Review and 
Recommendation" which briefly outlined Defendant's diagnosis, his violent 
conduct and threats toward other patients and hospital staff, his lack of cooperation 
with counseling efforts, the concerns voiced by female staff members, and the staff's 
belief that Defendant was "very dangerous[.]" Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 
(1999). 
Upon receiving the State Hospital's report, the court ordered a report and 
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") to discover "what 
programs might be available for [Defendant]." R. 3. The court set a sentencing 
hearing for March 1995. Id. 
At the March sentencing hearing, Judge Anderson reviewed the reports from 
the State Hospital and AP&P and heard from defense counsel and Defendant's 
father and brother. R. 2, 44 (Order and Commitment dated 3/15/95, attached in 
Addendum E).4 The judge then found that Defendant presented "a serious threat of 
4
 The order in Addendum E is from Defendant's other case and is offered as 
being representative of the order likely entered in this matter. The docket in this 
case outlines the resentencing hearing and Judge Anderson's ruling. R. 2-3. 
5 
violent behavior, with repetitive instances of criminal conduct/' and that he had an 
"attitude not conducive to probation[.]" R. 2,44. Citing his responsibility to protect 
society, the judge felt compelled to send Defendant to prison. R. 2, 43-44. 
Consequently, he reimposed the same statutory prison terms, but ran all three 
sentences consecutively instead of concurrently. R. 2,44. 
Nearly twelve years later, in February 2007, Defendant filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief, challenging the change at resentencing from concurrent to 
consecutive sentences. See Prion v. State, 2007 UT App 163U, *1 ['Prion V]; Prion v. 
State, 2008 UT App 189U, *1 n.l ['Prion 3"] (both in Addendum F). The district 
court dismissed the petition because "it was barred by the statute of limitations/7 
and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on appeal. See Prion I at *1. This 
Court summarily reversed, directing a remand "to address the interests-of-justice 
exception, as well as any other provisions of the PCRA [Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act] that have not been considered but may be relevant to its adjudication." Prion v. 
State, 2007 UT 80, f 3,171 P.3d 426 ['Prion 2"] (in Addendum F). 
.Two months later, in December 2007, the district court dismissed the petition.5 
See Prion 3, at *1. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant's appeal from that 
dismissal as untimely, but suggested that the sentencing issue he sought to raise 
5
 The record before this Court does not detail the basis for the dismissal. 
6 
could be pursued by a motion filed under rule 22(e), Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure. See id. at *1, n.l. 
Defendant filed a rule 22(e) motion in each of his criminal cases eight months 
later. R. 1, 31-61. He argued, among other things, that changing his concurrent 
sentences to consecutive sentences increased his sentence in violation of double 
jeopardy. R. 15,54-58, 60-61. 
Judge Anderson denied the motion by written order entered on April 13, 
2009. R. 1, 15-16 (Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence, attached in Addendum G). The judge recognized that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause applies only where "the defendant reasonably believes the original 
sentence is final/7 R. 15 (citing State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476,479 (Utah App. 1999)). 
In this case, he reasoned, Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) expressly permitted the 
court to recall the original sentence and commitment and re-sentence Defendant 
after his temporary stay in the State Hospital. See id. In light of the express 
statutory direction and the fact that the original sentencing order itself reserved 
jurisdiction in the court to resentence Defendant, the judge ruled that Defendant 
could have had "no reasonable expectation that the September 1,1994, sentence was 
final[.]" R. 15-16. 
Defendant timely appealed in both cases, and each was assigned a separate 
case number. R. 17-18. The appeal in this case was assigned Case No. 20090380— 
7 
CA, while the appeal in Defendant's other case was assigned Case No. 20090381 — 
CA. The latter appeal was dismissed for failure to file a docketing statement. 
See RR. 123. 
The appeal in this case resulted in a short, unpublished per curiam decision 
summarily affirming the lower court's denial of the motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. See State v. Prion, 2009 UT App 219U (per curiam) (attached in Addendum 
H). The court of appeals agreed that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) expressly directed the 
trial court to retain jurisdiction to resentence a GAMI defendant after a brief 
commitment to the State Hospital. Id. at f^ 2. The court of appeals also agreed that 
"the double jeopardy clause 'only proscribes resentencing where the defendant has 
developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his original sentence/" Id. at f 3 
(quoting State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 8, 975 P.2d 476). Because the 
sentencing court's original sentencing order in this case followed the statutory 
directive to "retain[] jurisdiction to alter or amend its originally contemplated 
sentence," and because the order "expressly indicated] that Prion's sentence would 
be reconsidered once he was released from his mental health treatment[,]" the court 
of appeals concluded that Defendant could not have legitimately expected that the 
original sentencing order "constituted his final sentence." Id. at \4. Accordingly, 
the court found no double jeopardy violation and affirmed the district court's denial 
of Defendant's rule 22(e) motion. See id. 
8 
This Court granted Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No statement of facts is necessary to a determination of the issues presented 
in this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that his double 
jeopardy rights were not implicated when, pursuant to section 77-16a-202(l)(b), his 
original sentence was recalled and he was resentenced to consecutive, rather than 
concurrent, terms. First, he claims that the statute permits only a redetermination of 
the location of his commitment, not its length. However, the plain, unambiguous 
language of the statute provides that if the sentencing order includes a 
''commitment and retention of jurisdiction^]" the judge "may recall the sentence 
and commitment, and resentence the offender." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). 
Section 77-16a-104(3) provides a two-step process for sentencing a defendant who is 
found to be guilty and mentally ill [GAMI]: (1) imposition of the appropriate 
sentence for the crime; and (2) determination of the location of the offender's 
commitment. This interpretation gives meaning to each term used by the 
Legislature and permits the sentencing court the flexibility to commit a GAMI 
defendant to the State hospital for a short period, and to then use the information 
gleaned from that visit to fashion a sentence providing for the most effective mental 
9 
health treatment and punishment. The sentencing court properly implemented 
these statutes consistent with their plain language and imposed a legal sentence. 
Second, Defendant claims that the resentencing violated his double jeopardy 
rights because he developed a legitimate expectation of finality in the maximum 
aggregate term of his original sentence before the resentencing. No such legitimate 
expectation arose where the plain language of the G AMI sentencing statutes and the 
sentencing court's original sentencing order clearly provided for modification of the 
sentence following Defendant's brief commitment to the State Hospital. Absent a 
legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence, double jeopardy 
protections are not implicated. 
ARGUMENTS 
Introduction 
This is an appeal from the denial of a rule 22(e) motion challenging the 
validity of Defendant's sentencing under Utah's GAMI statutes. See Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22(e). Relief under rule 22(e) is appropriate only when a sentence is found to be 
illegal or to have been imposed in an illegal manner. See id. An illegal sentence is 
narrowly defined as one that is "patently" illegal (State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 
(Utah 1995)), or "manifestly" illegal (State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, | 5, 48 P.3d 228). 
But see State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, f 11, 232 P.3d 1008 (an illegal sentence also 
includes constitutional violations). A "patently" or "manifestly" illegal sentence 
10 
generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no 
jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range. See 
Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5, n. 1. But see Candedo, 2010 UT 32, | 13. Defendant's 
sentence involves neither situation. 
Here, the sentence is, without doubt, within the authorized statutory range. If 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Defendant, then the resentencing 
would be illegal, and Defendant's rule 22(e) motion would be well-taken. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(e). The GAMI statutes, however, expressly confer jurisdiction on the 
trial court to resentence Defendant under the circumstances of this case. See Point I, 
infra. Because the sentencing court retained jurisdiction in its original order as 
required by the plain language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court had jurisdiction 
when it resentenced Defendant, and the sentence was legal for purposes of rule 
22(e), even if a double jeopardy problem existed.6 There was, in fact, no double 
jeopardy problem in this case. See Point II, infra. 
Defendant challenges the court of appeals' determination that his double 
jeopardy rights were not implicated when the trial court recalled his sentence under 
section 77-16a-202(l)(b) and resentenced him to the same statutory sentences, but 
6
 Defendant does not contend that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to 
resentence him, only that it could not increase the maximum term of his sentence. 
See Aplt. Br. at 6, 7-12. 
11 
ran them consecutively rather than concurrently. See Aplt. Br. at 7-21. He raises 
two main issues: (1) the court of appeals misinterpreted the statute to permit an 
increase in the original sentence rather than a change in the location of his 
commitment; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously determined that he had no 
legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentences. See id. The State 
addresses each claim below. 
I. 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE GAMI SENTENCING 
STATUTES CONFERS JURISDICTION ON A SENTENCING 
COURT TO RESENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO ANY 
LAWFUL SENTENCE FOLLOWING A TEMPORARY 
COMMITMENT TO THE STATE HOSPITAL 
Defendant first argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that when an 
offender, convicted under Utah's Guilty and Mentally 111 ("GAMI") statutes, is 
sentenced and committed to the State Hospital for treatment under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1999), the trial court may resentence that offender to a longer 
maximum term so long as the court retained jurisdiction in the original sentencing 
order. See Aplt. Br. at 7-21. He contends that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) does not 
permit the imposition of an increased maximum sentence, including a change from 
concurrent to consecutive sentences. See id. at 8-14. He argues that interpreting the 
statute to allow this violates state and federal due process and jury trial rights. See 
id. 
12 
Defendant's interpretation of the statute is contrary to its plain language. His 
constitutional arguments are not properly before this Court because they are 
unpreserved and unaccompanied by any claim of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. 
A. The GAMI Sentencing Statutes Allow a Sentencing Increase 
Defendant begins by arguing that the court of appeals should have found that 
the sentencing judge lacked authority to increase his sentence by imposing 
consecutive rather than concurrent terms because the governing sentencing statutes 
permit a change only in where the sentence is served, not its length. See Aplt. Br. at 
8-12. In other words, on resentencing, the judge is limited to deciding whether 
Defendant should be put on probation, sent to prison, or recommitted to the State 
Hospital. See id. at 11 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3)). No such limiting 
language appears in the statutes, however, and Defendant's argument ignores the 
statutes' plain language. 
The Plain Language of the G AMI Sentencing Statutes. This Court construes 
statutes "'to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve.'" State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, f 18,193 R3d 92 (quoting 
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,134,52 P.3d 1210). The best evidence of that intent is "'the 
plain language of the statute itself.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54, f 6, 
165 P.3d 1206) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, f 7, 217 P.3d 
13 
265. Only if the statutory language is ambiguous does this Court turn to secondary 
principles of statutory construction. See Utah Dept of Tramp, v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 
If22,218 P.3d 583; State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, If 11,133 P.3d 396. Moreover, "[w]hen 
examining the statutory language, we assume the legislature used each term 
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning'" and avoid any 
construction that renders any term superfluous. Miller, 2008 UT 61, |18 (quoting 
State ex rel Z.C, 2007 UT 54, Tf 6). 
The analysis in this case necessarily begins with section 77-16a-104(3), which 
provides for sentencing upon entry of a verdict of guilty and mentally ill. That 
section provides that: 
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that 
could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill 
and who is convicted of the same offense, and: 
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 77-16a-202 . . . ; 
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or 
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place 
the defendant in the custody of UDC [the Department of 
Corrections]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3) (Supp. 1994). Under the plain language of this 
statute, once a judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is 
14 
mentally ill, he is to 1) impose a legal sentence upon the defendant as if he were not 
mentally ill, and 2) determine whether to commit him to prison, probation, or the 
State Hospital. See id. In this case, the judge followed this statute by finding 
Defendant to be mentally ill, imposing the proper statutory sentence for his offenses, 
and then committing him to the State Hospital. R. 46-48. 
Because the judge committed Defendant to the State Hospital, section 77~16a-
104(3)(a) directs him to comply with section 77-16a-202. That provision provides 
that: 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the 
department under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that 
he be committed to the department for care and treatment for no 
more than 18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, 
whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time, the court 
may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the 
offender. A commitment and retention of jurisdiction under this 
subsection shall be specified in the sentencing order. If that 
specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender 
shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a). [7] 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under 
Subsection (l)(b), the department shall provide the court with reports 
7
 Subsection (l)(a) provides for a transfer of the offender between the State 
Hospital and the prison without a resentencing option and, hence, is not applicable 
to this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(a). 
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of the offender's mental health status every six months. Those reports 
shall be prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 77-
16a-203.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) & (3). 
Defendant argues that the required reports from the State Hospital merely 
evaluate his current mental condition and therefore essentially "determine[] the best 
location for the convicted person to serve a sentence, not the length of that 
sentence." Aplt. Br. at 10-11. Because the evaluation bears on location, he contends, 
the statute's directive that the court "may recall the sentence and commitment, and 
resentence the offender" necessarily requires that the court return to section 77-16a-
104(3), ignore the requirement of imposing a legal sentence, and reevaluate whether 
to commit Defendant to prison, probation, or the State Hospital. See id. at 11. The 
court here, he argues, exceeded the scope of the statute by reassessing his criminal 
culpability and then increasing his maximum sentence. See id. at 11-12. 
Defendant's interpretation is contrary to the plain language of both 
sentencing statutes. The plain language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b) provides that if 
the trial court includes a retention of jurisdiction in its sentencing order, the 
sentencing court "may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the 
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offender/ Id. Section 77-16a-202(l)(b) does not provide for recall of just the 
commitment or just the sentence, but both "the sentence and commitment^]" Id. 
(emphasis added). "Recall" is defined as "revoke, cancel, vacate, or reverse[.]" 
Black's Law Dictionary, 1139 (5th ed. 1979). In other words, the original judgment or 
verdict of guilt remains in full force, but both the "sentence and commitment" are 
effectively recalled and are no longer in effect. 
The statute then directs that the court "resentence" Defendant, without 
exception or restriction. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). Sentencing—and hence 
resentencing—under section 77-16a-104(3) still includes two parts, not one as 
Defendant suggests: (1) imposition of a legal sentence, "and" (2) a specific 
commitment of the accused to prison, probation, or the State Hospital. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-104(3). Consequently, with the benefit of the information now 
available through the observations and reports from the State Hospital regarding 
the accused's post-sentencing stay, including "an estimation of the offender's 
dangerousness... to himself or others [,]" the sentencing judge is to "resentence" the 
offender: i.e., impose both a legal sentence and a specific commitment to fill the 
void left by the recall. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a~104(3), -202(l)(b), and -203(3)(b). 
8
 Defendant does not, and cannot, contend that the trial court failed to include 
in the original sentencing order a retention of jurisdiction under section 77-16a-
202(l)(b). See Add. D. Neither does he argue that the court failed in any way to 
comply with the requirements of section 77-16a-104. 
17 
Hence, the court is again required to "impose any sentence that could be imposed 
under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the 
same offense/' and to commit the accused to prison or to probation or to recommit 
him to the State Hospital. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3). In addition, the 
court must necessarily make "'the determination of whether . . . simultaneously 
imposed sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively" inasmuch as that 
determination "is to be made at the time of sentencing[.]'" State v. Anderson, 2009 
UT13, \ 11,203 P.3d 990 (quoting State v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, % 16,156 P.3d 
839). 
A Reasonable Result. This plain language interpretation of section 77-16a-
202(l)(b) leads to a rational result. The fact that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) recalls both 
the sentence and the commitment, coupled with the fact that resentencing under 
section 77-16a-104(3) provides for imposition of both a legal sentence and a specific 
commitment, ensures the greatest flexibility in sentencing. It is reasonable that the 
Legislature would give sentencing courts flexibility to change a sentence in the 
context of guilty and mentally ill offenders to ensure a sentence is tailored to the 
needs of mentally ill offenders. Indeed, Utah is unique in providing mentally ill 
offenders the "inventive" alternative of being found guilty and mentally ill. See 
State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 367-68 (Utah 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-102(2) 
(West 2004). Utah's GAMI statutes represent a compassionate alternative by which 
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convicted offenders, who were mentally ill at the time of their crime, receive special 
hospitalization and treatment if they remain mentally ill at the time of sentencing. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104; see also State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372,1378 (Utah 
1996) (characterizing "the GAMI verdict [a]s an improved and compassionate form 
of punishment" for legally sane but mentally ill offenders who would otherwise be 
entitled to no special sentencing); see also Herrera, 895 P.2d at 367-68 ("[TJhe mens 
rea model coupled with this inventive verdict [GAMI] is a constitutionally valid 
system of dealing with an ever-adapting field . . [and] a legitimate approach to 
dealing with the sometimes baffling relationship between insanity and mens rea/'). 
The sentencing court needs flexibility to most accurately meet the needs of GAMI 
defendants at sentencing because the effectiveness of the mental health treatment 
provided under section 77-16a-202(l)(b) cannot be predicted. The plain language 
used by the Legislature ensures the best possible fit of both mental health treatment 
and punishment by providing an opportunity for a GAMI defendant to obtain 
adequate mental health treatment and to thereafter receive the most appropriate 
sentence to suit both his offense as well as his mental health status. 
Further, information relevant to sentencing concerning an offender's 
correctional and supervisory needs may come to light during the offender's time at 
the State Hospital, as occurred here. The Legislature allows the district court to 
tailor a sentence and commitment to the individual GAMI defendant's mental 
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condition by providing this opportunity for additional information. Such 
information may, but need not always, justify a sentencing change and may result in 
a sentencing reduction as readily as a sentencing increase. In any event, 
resentencing pursuant to the plain language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b) best permits 
the sentencing court to ensure the most appropriate length and form of punishment 
for this unique subset of offenders. 
Finally, this interpretation takes into account each term used by the 
Legislature, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of those terms. In contrast, 
Defendant's interpretation does not account for the "recall [of] the sentence and 
commitment/' and provides only for a partial resentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-
16a-202(l)(b) (emphasis added); Aplt. Br. at 9-12. Had the Legislature intended to 
permit the court to alter only the location of the commitment, it could easily have 
allowed for recall of the commitment alone and omitted any reference to recall of 
"the sentence^]" Moreover, under Defendant's interpretation, the sentencing court 
is not free to change the sentence at all, with the result that should the court deem a 
reduction from consecutive to concurrent sentencing to be appropriate following a 
temporary commitment to the State Hospital, it would be unable to so tailor the 
sentence to fit the situation. See Aplt. Br. at 6,11. Nothing in the plain language of 
the statute suggests that the Legislature intended to bind the hands of the 
sentencing court so thoroughly. 
20 
This Case. Judge Anderson did exactly what the statute 's plain language 
permits: "resentence[d] the offender" by "impos[ing] any sentence that could be 
imposed under law" on a convicted offender who was not mentally ill. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-104(3) and -202(l)(b). The first sentence was imposed after 
entry of a guilty plea and presentation of testimony from Dr. Robert Howell 
recommending commitment to the State Hospital under section 77-16a-202(l)(b) to 
regulate Defendant's medication. R. 5-6. The resentencing involved a full 
sentencing hearing, ensuring that the sentencing determination was based on all 
available relevant information. Indeed, nothing in the plain language of the GAMI 
sentencing statutes restricts the scope of the sentencing factors or information to be 
considered on resentencing. Judge Anderson obtained and reviewed the hospital's 
report, acquired and considered for the first time a presentence investigation report, 
and heard statements from Defendant's counsel, father, and brother. R. 2,44. Only 
then did the judge find: 
That Def[endant]'s past records indicate serious problems and that 
[the] reports indicate Defendant] does pose [a] serious threat of violent 
behavior and criminal conduct. Def [endantj's attitude is not conducive 
to supervision. Because of the threat to society, the court must 
reimpose [the] sentences previously imposed. 
R. 2,44. In other words, the judge considered all the relevant information available 
to him—including "the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant" — and determined from that information that a heightened concern for 
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societal protection existed. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (outlining the 
information "the court shall" consider when determining whether sentences are to 
run concurrently or consecutively); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 
1993) (an accused may be sentenced for purposes other than rehabilitation, 
including the protection of society) (citing State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 265, 268 
(Utah 1986)). It is up to the Board of Pardons and Defendant, through his own 
actions in prison, whether or not he will remain incarcerated for the aggregate 
maximum term of his sentence. See Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 669 
(Utah 1997) (the Board has the authority to determine the actual number of years 
served in Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme). 
The Statutes do not Prohibit the Instant Change. Defendant ultimately 
contends that, as a matter of policy, the GAMI sentencing statutes should be 
interpreted as preventing an increase in the maximum term imposed in the original 
sentence. See Aplt. Br. at 20-21. He relies on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1994)) to 
support his argument. See id. That statute prohibits increasing a sentence following 
reversal of a conviction or sentence on appeal: 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct 
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new 
sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the 
same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the 
portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1). That statute, he claims, is aimed at encouraging 
defendants to freely exercise their right to appellate review without the fear of 
receiving an increased punishment on retrial after a successful appeal. See Aplt. Br. 
at 20 (citing State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, If 15, 99 P.3d 858). He contends that a 
similar rationale should apply here to prevent an increase in his maximum sentence 
on resentencing under the GAMI scheme. See Aplt. Br. at 20-21. He reasons that a 
similar prohibition on increasing a GAMI sentence would encourage mentally ill 
defendants to be more forthcoming with hospital personnel and to more freely vent 
their aggressive or difficult behavior at the State Hospital without fear that their 
conduct could adversely affect their sentence. See id. 
Clearly, Defendant's proposed limitation does not serve the same policy 
concern as section 76-3-405. In fact, to the extent a GAMI defendant is able to 
control his violent urges and present himself favorably to hospital personnel, the 
statute provides an incentive to do so by allowing for a reduction in sentence or the 
possibility of probation following his temporary stay at the hospital. But if 
Defendant's interpretation holds, that incentive would be removed because, as 
explained, a sentencing court would be prohibited from reducing a GAMI 
defendant's sentence, even though circumstances might warrant it. 
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Additionally, the sentencing restriction after a reversal in section 76-3-405 
contains an exception which explains why a similar cap is both unnecessary and 
undesirable under the GAMI statutes: 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known 
to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court 
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the basis 
for the increased sentence^] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2). That is the precise situation which arises upon 
commitment to the State Hospital under section 77-16a-202(l)(b). The State Hospital 
is required to periodically evaluate the accused's mental condition and provide 
periodic reports and recommendations to the court. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-
202(3) and -203. On resentencing, any alteration to the sentence —either up or 
down—incorporates the information provided by the State Hospital and likely 
unavailable at the time of the original sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
202(l)(b). 
Here, the sentencing court stated that the hospital's reports were given "great 
weight" in the resentencing determination. R. 2,43-44. The temporary commitment 
of any defendant to the State Hospital under the GAMI statutes—which necessarily 
contemplates the acquisition and use of information that was "not known to the 
court at the time of the original sentence" — is precisely the type of situation the 
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Legislature has recognized is not amenable to a limitation on the maximum term of 
the original sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a). That the Legislature 
intended no such limitation in GAMI sentencing is further demonstrated by the fact 
that the GAMI statute does not contain any restriction on the court's ability to 
"recall the sentence and commitment and resentence the offender/' aside from the 
need to reserve jurisdiction to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). 
Finally, had the Legislature intended to prohibit a change in the maximum 
term of imprisonment on resentencing under the GAMI statutes, it could readily 
have done so by following its own example from section 76-3-405. It did not. That 
omission speaks volumes as to the meaning of the language the Legislature chose to 
include in the GAMI sentencing statutes. 
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and where the 
ordinary meaning of the statute's plain language permits the sentencing court to 
increase the sentence under circumstances present in this case, the statute allows the 
trial court's action in this case. 
B. Defendant's Assertion that the Plain Language of the 
Sentencing Statutes Carries the Potential for State and Federal 
Constitutional Violations was not Preserved for Review 
Defendant contends that interpreting the sentencing statutes to permit an 
increase in his sentence would violate the Sixth Amendment to the federal 
constitution as well as his right to a jury trial under the Utah Constitution. See Aplt. 
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Br. at 12-14. He admits that he did not previously present these claims for appellate 
review, but argues that they warrant consideration by this Court because they 
demonstrate a "future" constitutional concern in the event his sentencing 
interpretation is rejected by yet another court. Id. at 13. 
Because the arguments were not presented to the court of appeals and did not 
arise for the first time from that court's decision, they are not properly before this 
Court. See Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, f 19 n.3,52 P.3d 1267 
(refusing to reach an issue not raised before the court of appeals where it did "not 
arise solely out of the court of appeals' decision") (quoting DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 
428,444 (Utah 1995)); Maguire, 957 P.2d at 600 (refusing to reach on certiorari review 
a double jeopardy issue not addressed by the court of appeals). Neither were the 
arguments included in Defendant's request for certiorari review or "fairly included 
therein[.]" Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition or 
fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."). Defendant cites 
no authority supporting the presentation of these claims for the first time on 
certiorari review, provides no reason for his failure to timely raise the claims before 
now, and offers no principled reason to ignore the preservation rule. See Aplt. Br. at 
12-14. If there is any "constitutional concern]] in the future[,]" it may be addressed 
in due course in a case in which the matter is timely presented in an appropriate 
manner so as to permit full and fair consideration of the claims. Id. at 13. 
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II. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS NOT IMPLICATED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HAD NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF 
FINALITY IN HIS ORIGINAL SENTENCE 
Defendant contends that the increase in his maximum sentence violates the 
double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See Aplt. Br. at 14-21. 
Defendant does not argue that the state constitution provides any more or less 
protection than the federal constitution. Hence, the State presents only a federal 
constitutional analysis herein. See State v. Cahoon, 2007 UT App 269, f 8, n.l, 167 
P.3d 533 (conducting only a federal constitutional review absent presentation of a 
basis for an independent state constitutional review), rev'd on other grounds, State v. 
Cahoon, 2009 UT 9,203 P.3d 957. He argues first that his original sentence was final 
for double jeopardy purposes when it was signed and entered by the trial court, 
when he commenced his sentence in the State Hospital, or when the time for filing 
an appeal expired. See id. at 14-17. He then contends that he had a legitimate 
expectation of finality in the first sentence. See id. at 17-19. Finally, he asserts that 
because jeopardy attached, the lower court was prohibited from increasing his 
sentence on resentencing. See id. at 20-21. Defendant's arguments are contrary to 
established law. 
The Law. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: 
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . " 
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U.S. Const, amend. V. The clause "'embodies three separate protections: (1) 
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) 
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 
(3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense/" State v. 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, If 36,218 P.3d 610 (quoting Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1,111, 
106 P.3d 707); see also State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Eight Hundred 
Dollars, 942 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1997); Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, | 7. Defendant's 
challenge purports to implicate the third protection. 
But '"[sentencing procedures traditionally receive less double jeopardy 
protection than do prosecutions/ . . . and resentencing per se does not implicate the 
double jeopardy protection from multiple punishments." Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 
f 11 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980)) 
(additional citation omitted). The lynchpin of the double jeopardy inquiry in this 
context is the existence of a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence. 
See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-37 (the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the finality 
of criminal judgments and prohibits alterations to sentences carrying a legitimate 
expectation of finality); Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ^ f 36 ("'[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause 
only proscribes resentencing where the defendant has developed a legitimate 
expectation of finality in his original sentence.'") (quoting Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 
f 8) (additional quotation omitted); see also United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 
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(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an 
increase in [his] sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. If, however, 
there is some circumstance which undermines the legitimacy of that expectation, 
then a court may permissibly increase the sentence."). Absent a legitimate 
expectation of finality in a sentence, double jeopardy does not bar the imposition of 
an increased sentence. See Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, *| 39 (absent legitimate expectation 
of finality in sentence not accurately reflecting plea agreement, subsequent increase 
in restitution arising from correction of error did not violate double jeopardy 
protections); Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^% 8-12 (defendant who voluntarily 
withdrew guilty plea had no legitimate expectation of finality in original 
proceedings, and subsequent increase in sentence did not violate Double Jeopardy 
Clause); see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139 (absent legitimate expectation of finality 
in original sentence, commencement of sentence did not prevent subsequent 
increase in sentence pursuant to statute); United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063,1066 
(10th Cir. 1992) ("When a second sentence imposed on resentencing is more severe 
than the original sentence, the relevant double jeopardy analysis requires that we 
ask whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his original 
sentence [;]" if not, the increase in sentence did not implicate double jeopardy 
concerns); see also Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984, 989-90 (Colo. 2007) ("[D]ouble 
jeopardy does not bar the imposition of an increased sentence if the defendant 
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lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence/'); People v. Adams, 128 
P.3d 260,261 (Colo. App. 2005) ("punishment for a criminal offense can be increased 
without violating the double jeopardy protections . . . when a defendant has no 
legitimate expectation of finality in his or her sentence"), cert denied (Feb. 21,2006); 
Sentence Review Panel et al v. Moseley, 663 S.E.2d 679, 683-84 (Ga. 2008) (where 
statute provided for modification of sentence after imposition, sentence was not 
final, no expectation of finality arose, and double jeopardy did not preclude 
subsequent increase in sentence); State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 483 (N.D. 1990) 
(absent legitimate expectation in finality of sentence, subsequent imposition of 
harsher sentence not prohibited by double jeopardy). 
In addition, where a sentence is, by statute, subject to further review and 
revision, generally no legitimate expectation of finality arises in the original 
sentence during the review period contemplated by the statute. See Romero, 179 P.3d 
at 990 ("Because the legislature provided for the possibility of a sentence increase 
under Romero's circumstances, Romero lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in 
his sentence/'); People v. Castellano, 209 P.3d 1208,1209-10 (Colo. App.) (defendant 
had no legitimate expectation of finality in original sentence subject to further 
review and possible alteration under criminal rules and statute which provided that, 
upon probation revocation, court could impose "any sentence . . . which might 
originally have been imposed . .."), cert, denied (Colo. June 29, 2009); Moseley, 663 
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S.E.2d at 683-84 ("when 'the legislature has provided that a sentence, once imposed, 
is subject to appeal and/or subsequent modification, [the sentence] . . . is not 
considered final or absolute/" and no reasonable expectation in its finality arises) 
(quoting Wilford v. State, 278 Ga. 718,720,606 S.E.2d 252 (2004)); Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 
at 482-83 (where defendant had statutory notice of possibility of more severe 
sentence upon revocation of probation, his resentencing to a greater sentence after 
revocation of probation was not violation of Double Jeopardy Clause because he 
had no legitimate expectation of finality in original sentence). 
Analysis, The determinative question, therefore, is whether Defendant had 
any legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. See Aplt. Br. at 17 
(acknowledging that "an illegitimate expectation of finality does not trigger double 
jeopardy protections"). The answer is no. 
The Legislature expressly provided for recalling the original "sentence and 
commitment" and for resentencing an offender under the circumstances present 
here. The Legislature did so without limitation on the permissible sentencing 
changes. See Point I, supra; Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). In compliance with 
the statute, Judge Anderson's initial sentencing order expressly provided that the 
Defendant would ultimately "be brought before th[e] Court for reconsideration in 
his sentence," and that the court "retain[ed] jurisdiction in this matter to alter or 
amend its [sentencing] order." R. 4,46. Defendant was charged with knowledge of 
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the statute and its provisions and could have had no expectation of finality in his 
sentence until the resentencing occurred and the sentence was no longer subject to 
modification under the statute. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-39 (defendant is 
charged with knowledge of statute permitting government to appeal sentence and 
can have no expectation of finality in sentence until appeal is concluded or time for 
appeal has expired). Defendant was also on actual notice that the original sentence 
was not final and was subject to being recalled and revised based on the trial court's 
sentencing order. Hence, he lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in his original 
sentence, and the resentencing did not violate his double jeopardy rights. See 
Adams, 128 P.3d at 262 (where statute provided for resentencing to "any sentence... 
which might originally have been imposed[,]" there was no legitimate expectation 
of finality in original sentences and lower court was free to change concurrent 
sentences to consecutive without violating Double Jeopardy Clause) (quotation 
omitted). 
Defendant contends that even if the statute provided authority for an 
increase in his sentence, he maintained 3 legitimate expectation in the finality of that 
sentence because jeopardy had attached. See Aplt. Br. at 14-17. He argues that "the 
original sentence was final for purposes of double jeopardy" because: (1) it became 
final for purposes of appeal upon entry of a written order; (2) neither party appealed 
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from the original order; and (3) he commenced service of the original sentence by 
his initial confinement in the State Hospital. Id. 
It is not simply a question, however, of whether jeopardy attached or a 
sentence is final for purposes of appeal, but of whether and when Defendant can 
reasonably expect finality in the sentence. See, e.g., DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128-29, 
132-39 (recognizing that jeopardy attaches before a judgment becomes final and 
rejecting position that pronouncement of criminal sentence carries constitutional 
finality and conclusiveness so as to prohibit legislative provision for subsequent 
review of sentence); Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, | | 8-9 (defendant acquired no 
expectation of finality in original sentence where, after completion of original 
sentence, he sought and received leave to withdraw his plea). Moreover, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that the pronouncement of a sentence does not carry 
such a degree of constitutional finality that subsequent statutory review or 
modification of the sentence is precluded by double jeopardy. See DiFrancesco, 449 
U.S. at 132-39. When review or modification is permitted by statute, a sentence is 
not considered final for double jeopardy purposes and no expectation of finality can 
arise. See id. at 135-41 (no legitimate expectation of finality upon imposition of 
sentence in view of statutory right to appeal); Moseley, 663 S.E.2d at 683-84 (sentence 
subject to appeal or modification not final or absolute for purposes of double 
jeopardy). Consequently, despite a defendant's subjective belief that a sentence has 
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been finally determined and that further modification is prohibited, no legitimate 
expectation of finality arises if a statute specifically provides for further review or 
modification. See, e.g., DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138-39 (rejecting claim that length of 
sentence is set upon commencement of sentence where law permits further review 
or modification of sentence). 
Here, none of the options suggested by Defendant triggered double jeopardy 
protections because they were not coupled with a legitimate expectation of finality 
in the original sentence. Here, each of the options necessarily occurred before the 
resentencing allowed under the GAMI statutes. Hence, the sentence remained 
subject to review and modification. The United States Supreme Court has 
determined that commencement of a sentence provides no legitimate expectation of 
finality in the face of a legislative declaration providing for modification. See 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-39. Moreover, where the original sentencing order is 
necessarily entered before commencement of the sentence, its entry can offer no 
more of a legitimate expectation of finality. Further, where the narrowly-drawn 
statute and the sentencing order itself alerted Defendant to the fact that the original 
sentence was not final, the expiration of the time for appealing that sentence cannot 
provide a legitimate expectation of finality when it occurs before the resentencing 
contemplated by the challenged statute. See also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-37 (no 
expectation of finality in sentence could arise until after "the finite period provided 
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by the statute" detailing a potential sentencing increase for dangerous special 
offenders; and expressly rejecting claim that commencement of sentence before 
statute's finite period triggers expectation of finality). Because the original sentence 
remained subject to the statutory resentencing provisions from the time of its 
inception, no legitimate expectation of finality arose before resentencing. See, e.g., 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138-39 (observing there can be no expectation of finality in 
original sentence when accused begins to serve it where statute specifically provides 
for additional sentence review); Castellano, 209 P.3d at 1209-10 ("'double jeopardy 
does not bar the imposition of an increased sentence if the defendant lacked a 
legitimate expectation of finality in the [original] sentence.'") (quoting Romero, 179 
P.3d at 989 and citing DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139); Adams, 128 P.3d at 261-62 (no 
legitimate expectation of finality in original sentence where resentencing provided 
for as matter of law). 
Defendant contends that he necessarily had a legitimate expectation of finality 
in the original sentence because of the absence of three specific situations which 
would ordinarily defeat any legitimate expectation: (1) the original sentence was 
not illegal; (2) he did not voluntarily challenge the original sentence; and (3) the 
original sentence did not "undermine[] the objectives of the criminal statute." See 
Aplt. Br. at 17-19. The absence of these circumstances, however, cannot render 
legitimate an expectation of finality which, as argued, supra, never arose. Moreover, 
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it was the express language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b), not the presence or absence 
of Defendant's circumstances, that prevented Defendant from possessing any 
legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. 
Defendant suggests that permitting the GAMI sentencing statutes to 
temporarily suspend his double jeopardy rights is a step toward permitting the 
Legislature to "nullify" double jeopardy protections entirely with a sweeping 
statutory directive that all sentences are subject to revision at any time. Aplt Br. at 
19. Where he did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in the original 
sentence, his double jeopardy rights were not suspended because they never arose. 
Moreover, his position ignores the judicial check on legislative enactments. Further, 
the well-defined resentencing directive at issue is anything but an open-ended 
nullification of double jeopardy rights. The resentencing provision of section 77-
16a-202(l)(b) specifically pertains to a narrow class of GAMI defendants identified 
by the trial court as needing interim treatment to better assess and implement the 
offender's mental health and sentencing needs. It applies over the course of a short, 
defined period of time commencing immediately after imposition of the original 
sentence. It accrues to the benefit of the GAMI offenders, providing the judge an 
opportunity to "stabilize^" the psychological condition of a small subset of 
offenders and to "ensure adequate mental health treatment" for the offenders so as 
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to permit the ultimate imposition of the best sentencing determination possible for 
each offender. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (West 2004). 
Finally, Defendant claims a legitimate expectation of finality in the maximum 
term of his original sentence based on a case from the Second Circuit. See Aplt. Br. 
at 20 (citing Stewart v. Scully, 925 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1991)). Aside from the fact that he 
has not established the existence of a legitimate expectation of finality, his reliance 
on Stewart is misplaced. 
Stewart represents an exception to normal double jeopardy analysis which 
lacks application to this case. Stewart pled guilty to attempted murder and was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of ten to twenty years. Stewart, 925 F.2d at 59. 
While serving his sentence, he discovered that the sentence was illegal because it 
did not apply to the specific offense of attempted murder to which he had pled 
guilty. See id. He moved to set aside the sentence and was ultimately resentenced to 
a term of eight to twenty-four years. See id. at 60. Stewart challenged the 
resentencing, and the Second Circuit Court ultimately ruled that the increase in 
Stewart's maximum term disturbed his legitimate expectation in the finality of his 
sentence, thus violating the protection against multiple punishments guaranteed by 
the double jeopardy clause. See id. at 60-65. The court acknowledged that it was 
departing from DiFrancesco and the United States Supreme Court's direction that 
there is no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which can, by statute, be 
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increased. See Stewart, 925 F.2d at 63-64 (providing examples of past decisions). The 
court explained that it was the particular circumstances of the case before it that 
prompted a departure from prior decisions and a determination that Stewart had an 
expectation of finality as to the maximum term of his original sentence. See id. 
Those circumstances included: the specific terms of Stewart's plea agreement, the 
trial court's express representations to Stewart at the change of plea hearing 
concerning the potential maximum sentencing terms, and the fact that Stewart had 
already served "a substantial part" of his sentence—three years—before discovering 
the illegality in the original sentence that required his resentencing. See id. at 61,64-
65. Thus, Stewart was based on the totality of the facts which supported the 
conclusion that Stewart had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of finality in his 
sentence. No such facts exist here. Stewart, therefore, does not help Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted November JU, 2010. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
/ 
Utah Attorney General 
-^ -—-—ZS f^sr'.... 
'KRIS C. LEONARD ^ ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Lemuel Prion, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Case No. 20090839-SC 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on October 6, 2009. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue. 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial 
of Petitioner's rule 22(e) challenge to his re-sentencing. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. 
For The Court: 
Dated ~20 l(y 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on January 21, 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail 
service, or hand delivered to the parties listed below: 
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PO BOX 250 
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KRIS C LEONARD 
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LISA COLLINS 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT, VERNAL DEPT 
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Dated this January 21, 2010. 
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Judicial Assistant ( ) 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20090S39 
EIGHTH DISTRICT, VERNAL DEPT Case No. 931800470 
Court of Appeals Case No. J0090380 
Addendum B 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (Supp. 1994): 
Verdict of guilty and mentally ill - Hearing to determine 
present mental state. 
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any 
lesser offense, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's 
present mental state. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to 
determine his mental condition, and may receive the evidence of any public or 
private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The 
defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only 
upon approval of the executive director. 
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is 
currently mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed 
under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the 
same offense, and: 
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 77-16a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate 
physical danger to self or others, including jeopardizing his own or 
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation 
setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such 
as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and 
(ii) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, 
care, custody, and security that is adequate and appropriate to the 
defendant's conditions and needs. In order to insure that the require-
ments of this subsection are met, the court shall notify the executive 
director of the proposed placement and provide the department with 
an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a recommenda-
tion to the court regarding placement prior to commitment; 
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or 
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the 
defendant in the custody of UDC. 
(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall 
sentence the defendant as it would any other defendant. 
(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in 
accordance with Subsection 76-16a-103(5). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1999): 
Commitment to department. 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department 
under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he 
be committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred 
to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he 
be committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 
18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs 
first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and 
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of 
jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing 
order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the 
offender shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the 
sentence of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense. 
In capital cases, the court shall make the findings required by this section after 
the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection 
(1Kb), the department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's 
mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the 
court may appoint an independent examiner to assess the mental health status 
of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence 
imposed by the court. Upon expiration of that sentence, the administrator of 
the facility where the offender is located may initiate civil proceedings for 
involuntary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title 
62A, Chapter 5. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1999): 
Review of guilty and mentally ill persons committed to 
department - Recommendations for transfer. 
(1) The executive director shall designate a review team of at least three 
qualified staff members, including at least one licensed psychiatrist, to 
evaluate the mental condition of each mentally ill offender committed to it in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once every six months. If the 
offender is mentally retarded, the review team shall include at least one 
individual who is a designated mental retardation professional, as defined in 
Section 62A-5-301. 
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in 
Subsection (1) shall make a report to the executive director regarding the 
offender's current mental condition, his progress since commitment, prognosis, 
and a recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill offender should be 
transferred to UDC or remain in the custody of the department. 
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator, 
and the board's mental health adviser that a mentally ill offender is 
eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team finds that the offender: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(ii) is still mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or 
others, but can be controlled if adequate care, medication, and 
treatment are provided, and that he has reached maximum benefit 
from the programs within the department. 
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is 
located shall provide the UDC medical administrator with a copy of the 
reviewing staffs recommendation and: 
(i) all available clinical facts; 
(ii) the diagnosis; 
(iii) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
(iv) the prognosis for remission of symptoms; 
(v) the potential for recidivism; 
(vi) an estimation of the offender's dangerousness, either to himself 
or others; and 
(vii) recommendations for future treatment. 
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NUMBER 931800470 State Felony 
FOR 
-94 Note: ENTERING THE PLEA TODAY IS NOT PREPARED. THE COURT 
CONTINUES 
-94 Note: THIS MATTER TO JULY 22, 1994 AT 10:00 A.M. 
-94 Note: Notice of Setting 
-94 HEARING ON STATUS scheduled on July 22, 1994 at 10:00 AM in 
ROOM 2 with Judge ANDERSON. 
-94 Note: Hearing (HEARING ON STATUS): JUDGE: JOHN R. 
ANDERSON 
-94 Note: TAPE: V-1037 COUNT: 0597 
-94 Note: ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M. ATP: URESK, ROLAND 
-94 Note: Deft Present 
-94 Note: COUNSEL FOR DEF INDICATED DEF WOULD LIKE TO ENTER PLEA OF 
GUILTY 
1-94 Note: AND MENTALLY ILL. COUNSEL INDICATED HRG. WOULD NEED TO BE 
SET. 
!-94 Note: COURT SETS HRG. FOR AUG. 19, 1994, AT 1:30 P.M. FOR 
TAKING OF 
1-94 Note: PLEA, AND IF PARTIES DO NOT STIPULATE, COUNTY ATTORNEY 
WOULD 
>-94 Note: NEED TO SUBPOENA DOCTORS TO BE HERE TO HAVE EVIDENTIARY 
HRG. TO 
> . 94 Note ENABLE COURT TO MAKE FINDINGS. 
Notice of Setting 
FILED 
FILED 
FILED 
RETURN OF SERVICE ON SUBPOENA (ROBERT J HOWELL) 
AMENDED SUBPOENA (DR. ROBERT HOWELL) 
SUBPOENA (DR. ROBERT J. HOWELL) WITH ACCEPTANCE 
2-94 Note 
L-94 Note 
3-94 Note 
3-94 Note 
OF 
9-94 Note: SERVICE 
9-94 HEARING DEFAULT scheduled on August 24, 1994 at 02:30 PM in 
ROOM 2 with Judge ANDERSON. 
1-94 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: JOHN R. 
ANDERSON 
1-94 Note: ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M. ATP: WALLENTINE, 
KENNETH 
1-94 Note: Deft Present 
1-94 Note: DR. ROBERT HOWE WAS SWORN AND TESTIFIED. DR. HOWE 
TESTIFIED DEF 
4-94 Note: IS MENTALLY ILL, BUT IS RESPONDING TO MEDICATION. HE ALSO 
4-94 Note: INDICATED DEF DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA TO BE SENT TO STATE 
4-94 Note: HOSPITAL, BUT COURT COULD SEND DEF TO STATE HOSPITAL IN 
ORDER TO 
4-94 Note: REGULATE MEDICATION WITH COURT STILL MAINTAINING 
JURISDICTION. 
4-94 Note: COUNSEL FOR PLA MAKES MOTION BASED ON TESTIMONY GIVEN TO 
ENTER 
4-94 Note: INTO PLEA AGREEMENT. COUNSEL FOR DEF INDICATED PLEA 
AGREEMENT 
4-94 Note: HAD BEEN REACHED FOR DEF TO ENTER GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 
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NUMBER 931800470 State Felony 
PLEAS 
24-94 Note: TO DANGEROUS WEAPON, F2, IN CASE #941800068, AND TO AGG. 
ASLT, 
24-94 Note: F3, AND DEALER IN POSS. W/O AFFIXING TAX STAMP, F3, IN 
THIS 
24-94 Note: CASE. ALL OTHER CHARGES IN BOTH CASES WOULD BE DISMISSED. 
COURT 
24-94 Note: EXPLAINED RIGHTS TO DEF. DEF STATED HE UNDERSTOOD HIS 
RIGHTS, 
24-94 Note: WAIVED HIS RIGHTS. COUNSEL FOR DEF GAVE FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
PLEA. 
24-94 Note: COUNSEL FOR DEF, COUNSEL FOR PLA, AND DEF EXECUTED 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
24-94 Note: DEF IN ADVANCE OF GUILTY PLEA AND AGREEMENT. DEF ENTERED 
PLEA OF 
24-94 Note: GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL AS INDICATED IN ABOVE PLEA 
AGREEMENT. 
24-94 Note: COURT FINDS PLEA WAS MADE KNOWINGLY, AND COURT ACCEPTS 
DEF'S 
24-94 Note: PLEA OF GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL. BASED ON STATE'S MOTION, 
COURT 
24-94 Note: DISMISSES REMAINING CHARGES IN BOTH CASES. 
24-94 Note: Chrg: NO PAY DRUG TAX Plea: Guilty Find: 
Guilty Plea 
•24-94 Note: 0 05 YEARS Suspended: 0 
•24-94 Note: COURT FINDS BASED ON DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT EFFECT OF 
MEDICINE 
-24-94 Note: IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLACE DEF WITH DEPT. OF 
CORRECTIONS 
•24-94 Note: RIGHT NOW. COURT FINDS DEF IS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL, 
HAVING 
-24-94 Note: MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE. COURT SENTENCES DEF TO 
0- 5 
24-94 Note: YEARS AT UTAH STATE PRISON FOR AGG. ASLT, F3, AND DEALER 
IN 
-24-94 Note: POSS. W/O AFFIXING TAX STAMP, F3. COURT ORDERS DEF 
COMMITTED TO 
-24-94 Note: THE CARE OF DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES FOR NO MORE THAN 18 
MONTHS. 
-24-94 Note: COURT ORDERS JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT BE SPECIFIC AND 
WILL 
-24-94 Note: REVIEW AND RESENTENCE DEF IN 18 MONTHS, OR SOONER. COURT 
WILL 
RECEIVE REPORTS OF DEF'S PROGRESS. 
DATED THIS DAY OF AUGUST, 19 94. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Chrg: 58-37-8.01 Find: Dismissed 
Chrg: 76-8-309 Find: Dismissed 
-24-94 Note 
-24-94 Note 
-24-94 Note 
-24-94 Note 
-24-94 Note 
-24-94 Note 
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.-95 
.-95 
.-95 
.-95 
.-95 
-95 
-9b 
-95 
-95 
-95 
-95 
Find: Dismissed 
Plea: Guilty Find: 
Note: Chrg: 58-3 7A-
Note: Sentence: 
Note: Chrg: AGG ASLT 
Guilty Plea 
Note: 005 YEARS Suspended: 0 
Other Agency control stay began 08/24/94 
Other Agency control stay ended 02/15/96 
COPY OF JUDGMENT SENT TO DEF AT UINTAH COUNTY JAIL 
FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN ADVANCE OF GUILTY 
AGREEMENT AND 
FILED: ORDER 
ORDER 
(JRA'S 
SIGNED 8-24-94) 
STAMP USED WITH HIS PERMISSION ON 
95) 
in ROOM 2 
JUDGE: JOHN R. 
ATP: STRINGHAM, JOANN 
Deft 
THIS 
not present 
CAME BEFORE THE COURT FOR RESENTENCING, 
Note 
Note 
Note 
Note 
AND 
Note 
Note 
9/1/94) 
Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed 
Note: FILED: ORDER TO TRANSPORT PRISONER (SIGNED 1-9 
Note: FILED: REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION FROM GMI 
Note: Notice of Setting 
Sentencing scheduled on January 31, 1995 at 10:01 AM 
with Judge ANDERSON. 
Note: Hearing (SENTENCING): 
ANDERSON 
Note: ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M. 
B. 
Note: 
Note: 
IS 
Note: 
PLA. 
Note: 
UTAH 
Note: 
PROBATION 
Note: AND PAROLE FOR A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO WHAT 
PROGRAMS 
Note: MIGHT 
Note: MARCH 
THE 
Note: REPORT AND SENTENCE CAN BE PRONOUNCED. 
HEARING ON STATUS scheduled on March 14, 1995 at 
ROOM 2 with Judge ANDERSON. 
Note. Hearing (HEARING ON STATUS 
ANDERSON 
Note: ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M. 
KENNETH R. 
Note: Deft Present 
Note: THIS CASE WAS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED UNDER GUILTY AND 
MENTALLY ILL 
Note: PLEA. AT THAT TIME, THE COURT REFERRED THIS MATTER TO 
DEPT OF 
PLEA 
DEF. 
NOT PRESENT BUT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. COUNSEL FOR 
REQUESTS A CONTINUANCE AND RECOMMENDS DEF. BE SENT TO THE 
STATE PRISON. THE COURT REFERS THIS MATTER TO ADULT 
BE 
14, 
AVAILABLE FOR DEF. 
1995 AT 10:00 A.M. 
A STATUS HEARING IS SET FOR 
TO SEE IF AP&P HAS COMPLETED 
10:01 AM in 
JUDGE: JOHN R. 
ATP: WALLENTINE, 
0r' OC: 3 
.ed: 02/04/10 10:05:58 Page 11 
5E NUMBER 931800470 State Felony 
14-95 Note: HUMAN SERVICES, BUT RETAINED JURISDICTION. THEIR REPORT 
HAS BEEN 
14-95 Note: RECEIVED AND PSI RECEIVED. COUNSEL FOR DEF INDICATED 
OBJECTIONS 
14-95 Note: TO REPORTS. DEF'S FATHER AND BROTHER ADDRESSED THE COURT. 
14-95 Note: COUNSEL FOR PLA STRONGLY DISAGREES WITH ANY PROBATION AND 
FEELS 
14-95 Note: GREAT WEIGHT MUST BE GIVEN TO PSI AND REPORTS RECEIVED. 
THE 
14-95 Note: COURT MAKES FINDINGS THAT DEF'S PAST RECORDS INDICATE 
SERIOUS 
-14-95 Note: PROBLEMS AND THAT REPORTS INDICATE DEF'S DOES POSE 
SERIOUS 
-14-95 Note: THREAT OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT. DEF'S 
ATTITUDE 
-14-95 Note: IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO SUPERVISION. BECAUSE OF THE THREAT TO 
-14-95 Note: SOCIETY, THE COURT MUST REIMPOSE SENTENCES PREVIOUSLY 
IMPOSED. 
-14-95 Note: Sentence: 
-14-95 Note: Chrg: AGG ASLT Plea: Guilty Find: 
Guilty Plea 
14-95 Note 
14-95 Note 
14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
0 05 YEARS Suspended: 0 
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed 
0 05 YEARS Suspended: 0 
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed 
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed 
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed 
THE COURT SENTENCES DEF TO INDETERMINATE SENTENCE NOT TO 
EXCEED 
-14-95 Note: 5 YEARS IN UTAH STATE PRISON FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, F3, 
AND 
-14-95 Note: 0-5 YEARS FOR DEALER IN POSS. W/O AFFIXING TAX STAMP. DEF 
IS 
-14-95 Note: SENTENCED TO 1-15 YEARS IN CASE 941800068 ALSO. TPE COURT 
ORDERS 
-14-95 Note: SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. DEF IS TO CONTINUE ON 
MEDICATION 
-14-95 Note: AND MEDICATION IS TO BE MONITORED. COURT WILL STAY 
EXECUTION OF 
-14-95 Note: SENTENCE UNTIL TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1995, TO ENABLE DEF'S 
MOTHER 
-14-95 Note: TO VISIT DEF BEFORE HE IS REMANDED TO CUSTODY OF 
DEPARTMENT OF 
-14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
-14-95 Note 
CORRECTIONS. 
DATED THIS DAY OF MARCH, 1995 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ANDERSON 
-14-95 Note DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-13-04 Filed. Letter from Lemuel Prion 
P r. r> ~ 
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Addendum D 
ROLAND URESK #3 3 07 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East: 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(801) 781-5436 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, :" 
P l a i n t i f f , : O R D E R 
v s . : 
LEMUEL PRION, : CASE NO. 9 3 18 00470 FS 
941800068 FS 
Defendant. 
This matter came on before the Court upon a hearing this the 
19th day of August, 1994, the Honorable John R. Anderson 
presiding. The State being represented by Roland Uresk, Deputy 
Uintah County Attorney. The Defendant being personally present 
and represented by Alan M. Williams. 
The Defendant having pled guilty and mentally ill to the 
charges of (1) Dangerous Weapon in Correctional Facility, a 
Second Degree Felony; (2) Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony; (3) Dealer in Possession without Affixing Tax Stamp, a 
Third Degree Felony. 
The Court, having heard comments from both parties makes the 
following findings: 
-.- ...
u
°0h'; 
\J £ 
W£ 
luQ/J 
&.* Thar the Defendant poses an immediate pfffsicalf 
flTariger" to himself or others, including jeopardizing his o*rn-or4 
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional o n 
probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic^ 
'necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if# 
'placed on probation.* 
2. Thau until the Defendant's medication is regulated 
he cannot be committed to the Department of Corrections. 
Based upon the foregoing the Court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Defendant is currently manually ill, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the Defendant is committed to the Department 
of Corrections for the follov/ing sentences: fa) Dangerous Weapon 
in Correctional Facility, a Second Degree Felony, not less than 
one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years; (b) Aggravated Assault, 
a Third Degree Felony, not mere than five (5) years; (c) Dealer 
in Possession witneut Affixing Tax Stamp, a Third Degree Felony, 
not more than five (5) years. Said sentences to run 
concurrently. 
2. That the Defendant is committed to the Department 
of Corrections for care and treatment for not more tnan eighteen 
(18) months, or until he has reached maximum benefit whichever 
2 
occurs first. Upon this determination the Defendant shall be 
brought before this Court lor reconsideration in his sentence. 
3. That the Department of Corrections shall file a 
progress report with the Court, the County Attorney and the 
Defendant's Attorney every six (6) months without fail. 
4. This Court retains jurisdiction in this matter LO 
alter or amend its order. 
DATED this 1 - ' day of September, 1994. f\ 
/ ft U 
JOHN -R. ANDERSON 
District Court, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\HAND DELIVERY <7 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West 
50 North #W10, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal, 
Utah 84078. 
DATED this ) ^  _ day of September, 1994, 
r. n n -
u u u U<•*1 j 
Addendum E 
KENNETH R. WALLENTINE #5817 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(801) 781-5435 
JiS* R»C7 COUR i 
MAP 15 199E 
p1' Qf ^,0 ^  
0 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
LEMUEL PRION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND COMMITMENT 
CASE NO. 941800068 FS 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for sentencing on the 14th 
day of March, 1995. Defendant appeared with his attorney, Alan M. 
Williams. The State was represented by Kenneth P. Wallentine, 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney. Defendant having plead guilty 
to the aforementioned charges, tne Court finds Defendant presents 
a serious threat of violent behavior, with repetitive instances of 
criminal conduct, and has an attitude not conducive to probation; 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for 
a term of not less than ONE (1) YEAR nor more than FIFTEEN (15) 
YEARS upon the offense of Dangerous Weapon in a Correctional 
Facility, a Second Degree Felony. Said sentence to be served 
consecutively with Case No. 941800470. Defendant is remanded to 
O \J \J 'y_, W -j. 
the custody of the Uintah County Sheriff to be delivered by him to 
the Warden of the Utah State Prison. 
2. It is the Court's recommendation that the Defendant 
continue on his prescribed medication. 
DATED this /< dav of March 
/ML I I " ^ - - -
A/CTOHN R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivered a true copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order of 
Commitment to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West 50 
North #W10, Vernal, UT 84078; Department of Corrections, 152 East 
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, VernaL, Utah 
84078. 
DATED this /C) day of March, 1995. 
> , . / / / ^ ,. 
[' /'' // /] /, f, " /-/ *' / / 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RLH.ES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Lemuel PRION, Petitioner and Appellant. 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20070249-CA. 
May 10,2007. 
Eighth District, Vernal Department, 070800083; 
The Honorable John R. Anderson. 
Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and 
DAVIS. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Lemuel Prion appeals the dismissal of his peti-
tion for postconviction relief. This case is before 
the court on a sua sponte motion for summary dis-
position. 
On August 29, 1994, Prion pleaded guilty to pos-
session of a dangerous weapon in a correctional fa-
cility, aggravated assault, and dealer in possession 
without affixing a tax stamp. Prion was sentenced 
on these charges on September 1, 1994, and March 
15, 1995. Prion did not file a motion for postcon-
viction relief until February 12, 2007. The district 
court dismissed Prion's petition on the grounds that 
relief was precluded under Utah Code section 
78-35a-107(l), which states, "[a] petitioner is en-
titled to relief only if the petition is filed within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued."Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) (Supp.2006). The dis-
trict court noted that, for purposes of this section, 
the cause of action accrues on "the date on which 
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on 
which the petition is based."A£ § 78-35a-107(2)(e). 
However, the district court ruled that "[tjhere is 
nothing in the petition, other than [Prion's] bald as-
sertion otherwise, indicating that [Prion] couldn't 
have known about the facts underlying the petition 
earlier.'Thus, the district court dismissed the peti-
tion on the basis that it was barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Prion argues that the district court erred b\ consid-
ering his petition on the merits without holding an 
evidentiary hearing. This assertion is contrary to 
rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SeeUtih R. Civ. P 65C. Specifically, rule 
65C(g)(l) provides: 
Die assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if 
it is apparent to the court that any claim has been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim 
in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the 
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the 
claim, stating either that the claim has been adju-
dicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. 
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the 
entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dis-
missal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
Utah Rule Civ. P. 65C(g)(l).FN1 Thus, the district 
court was not required to conduct a hearing and Pri-
on has consequently failed to show that the district 
court erred when it considered Prion's petition 
without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
FN1. We note that even when a postcon-
viction petition is fully briefed, rule 65C(j) 
specifically provides that the district court 
may either hold "a hearing or otherwise 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw. 
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H 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Lemuel PRION, Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 20070570. 
Oct. 16,2007. 
Eighth District, Vernal Dep't; The Honorable John 
R. Anderson, No. 070800083. 
Lemuel Prion, pro se, petitioner. 
be relevant to its adjudication. 
Utah,2007. 
Prion v. State 
171 P.3d 426, 589 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2007 UT 80 
END OF DOCUMENT 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PER CURIAM: 
f 1 This matter is before the court upon a Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari filed on June 22, 2007. 
K 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari is granted, and the 
court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's 
judgment is summarily reversed. 
K 3 Specifically, while the district court performed 
an assessment of the accrual of petitioner's cause of 
action for purposes of the Post-Conviction Remed-
ies Act's (PCRA) statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-35a-107(l), (2), it appears neither the 
court of appeals nor the district court separately ad-
dressed the interests-of-justice exception to that 
limitations period, section 78-35a-107(3). See also 
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400, and au-
thority cited therein. Also, neither court expressly 
determined that the petition was frivolous on its 
face or that it was procedurally barred by any other 
distinct provision of the PCRA. Accordingly, this 
matter should be remanded to address the interests-
of-justice exception, as well as any other provisions 
of the PCRA that have not been considered but may 
) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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dispose of the case."Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C(j). Thus, the district court has discre-
tion whether to hold an evidentiary hear-
ing, and the simple assertion that an evid-
entiary hearing should have been conduc-
ted is insufficient to show an abuse of this 
discretion. 
We affirm the dismi'sal »i I}HJ [Minimi for postcon-
viction relief .rN2 
FN2. Prion filed his own motion for sum-
mary reversal on the basis of manifest er-
ror. &eUtah R.App. P. 10(a)(2)(B). In 
light of the disposition of this appeal, Pri-
on's motion is denied. 
Utah App.,2007. 
Prion v. State 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 13t>bj81 (Utah 
App.), 2007 UT App 163 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK OM'RT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Lemuel PRION, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20080257-CA. 
May 22, 2008. 
Eighth District, Vernal Department, 070800083; 
The Honorable John R. Anderson. 
Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and McHUGH. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Lemuel Prion seeks to appeal the trial court's 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
This is before the court on its own motion for sum-
mary disposition. Because this court lacks jurisdic-
tion, it must dismiss the appeal. 
The trial court entered its order on December 18, 
2007. Prion filed a motion for an extension of time 
to appeal, along with a notice of appeal, on Febru-
ary 21, 2008. The motion for an extension was un-
timely and, therefore, so was the notice of appeal. 
A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days 
after the entry of the order appealed. SeeUtah 
R.App. P. 4(a). The timely filing of a notice of ap-
peal is jurisdictional. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 
100, K 5, 57 P.3d 1065. If a notice of appeal is not 
timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction and must 
dismiss the appeal. See id. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that a trial court may extend the time to 
appeal for good cause. SeeUtah R.App. P. 4(e). A 
motion to extend the time to appeal must be filed 
no later than thirty days after the initial appeal time 
has expired. See id. Prion's motion was due no later 
than February 19, 2008, but it was not filed until 
February 21. Accordingly, the motion was untimely 
and the trial court could not consider it. SeeUtah 
R.App. P. 2 (stating that the time frames in rule 
4(e) cannot be suspended). Because the motion to 
extend the time to appeal was untimely, the notice 
of appeal is untimely and this court lacks jurisdic-
tion over this appeal. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.FN1 
FNL Prion asserts that the trial court erred 
when it sentenced him to a harsher sen-
tence at resentencing. Although this court 
cannot reach the issue in this appeal be-
cause it lacks jurisdiction, Prion may be 
able to raise the issue in the context of 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), 
which has no time bar. SeeUtah R.Crim. P. 
22(e). 
Utah App.,2008. 
Prion v. State 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 
App.), 2008 UT App 189 
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Addendum G 
• ^ T K A , 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T \ ^ % J \ '' / ? '$£ 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H N ^ m ^ ° <%fy ^ 
^ P ^ 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. . 
Lemuel Prion, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
Case No. 941800068 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. 
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to correct an illegal 
sentence at any time. 
On September 151994, this Court found that the Defendant was mentally ill The Court 
imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences to 
run concurrently. The Court ordered the Defendant to be committed to the Department of 
Corrections for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until the Defendant reached 
maximum benefit. The Court ordered that after that period of care and treatment, the Defendant 
would be brought before the Court for reconsideration of his sentence. 
On March 15, 1995, the Defendant was brought before the Court for sentencing. The 
Court imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences 
to run consecutively. 
Page 1 of. 2 
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The Defendant argues that the sentence imposed was illegal because it violated his right 
to be free of double jeopardy. Specifically, the Defendant argues that when he was sentenced 
after the 18 month period in the State Hospital, he received a longer sentence. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause states "[n]or shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. Const amend V. u[T]he Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against multiple punishments, as well as multiple 
prosecutions, for the same crime." State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 1999). 
However, the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects against re-sentencing when the defendant 
reasonably believes the original sentence is final. Id. at 479. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-202(b) allows a court to recall the sentence and commitment, 
and re-sentence the offender after the offender has been in the State Hospital for the specified 
period of time. Here, the Defendant had no reasonable expectation that the September 1, 1994, 
sentence was final because the Court specifically stated that the Defendant's sentence would be 
reconsidered after the 18 month period. Therefore, the Defendant's sentence did not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and was not illegal. 
The Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is denied. 
/ JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge 
Page 2 of 2 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 941800068 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: LEMUEL PRION UTAH STATE PRISON, #23738 P.O. BOX 2b J DRAPER, 
UT 84020-0250 
BY HAND: JOANN B STRINGHAM 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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PI L E D 
H T AH APPELLATE COURTp 
AUG I 3 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lemuel Prion, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20090380-CA 
r 1 L h D 
(August 13, 2009) 
2009 UT App 219 
Eighth District, Vernal Department, 931800470 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
Attorneys: Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davis. 
PER CURIAM: 
Lemuel Prion appeals the district court's order denying his 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. This matter is before us 
on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. We affirm. 
Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) permits the district court 
to sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment and order that 
the offender first be committed to the Department of Human 
Services for treatment until the offender's condition has been 
stabilized, but in no case shall the offender be committed for 
more than eighteen months. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (b) 
(2008). At the expiration of an offender's treatment, "the court 
may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the 
offender." Id. A commitment and retention of the district 
court's jurisdiction under Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) "shall 
be specified in the sentencing order." Id. 
Prion asserts that the district court violated his 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it 
recalled his sentence, pursuant to section 77-16a-202(b), and 
determined to run the sentences consecutively rather than 
concurrently. This court previously determined that the double 
jeopardy clause "only proscribes resentencing where the defendant 
has developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his 
original sentence." State v. Macruire, 1999 UT App 45, t 8, 975 
P.2d 476. Thus, where there is no legitimate expectation of 
finality in the first proceeding, there can be no violation of 
double jeopardy protections. See id. 
As required by Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b), the 
September 1, 19 94 order provided that the district court retained 
jurisdiction to alter or amend its originally contemplated 
sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(b). Additionally, the 
September 1, 1994 order expressly indicated that Prion's sentence 
would be reconsidered once he was released from his mental health 
treatment. Thus, we cannot say that Prion could legitimately 
expect that the September 1, 1994 order constituted his final 
sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not violate 
Prion's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.1 
Affirmed. 
^ L ^ / . ^UJ^VAA^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
P r e s i d i n g Judge 
\&&JL 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
James %/.Davis, J^idqe 
1. Prion raises additional issues on appeal. We determine that 
those issues lack merit and do not address them. 
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